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Number 1/2007
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The infrahumanization phenomenon: A preliminary test
of the generalization-of-the self explanation
Monika Mirosławska, Mirosław Kofta
University of Warsaw, Psychology Faculty
Abstract |
People tend to ascribe secondary (specifically human) emotions to ingroup
members more than to outgroup members, whereas no such tendency is observed
for primary (basic) emotions (the phenomenon of infrahumanization). In our study
we compared J.P. Leyens' essentialistic explanation (humanity as an essence
of ingroup category) to the generalization-of-the-self explanation (the model
suggested by research on the self as a source of ingroup image) of the phenomenon.
Participants ascribed personality traits and emotions to the self. Then,
in the minimal group paradigm, they made the same ascriptions, this time to the
(minimal) ingroup and outgroup. No general infrahumanization effect emerged,
whereas strong ingroup bias was found. In line with generalization-of-the-self
approach, participants from the subgroup with stronger self-ascriptions of secondary
than primary emotions showed the classical infrahumanization effect, whereas
participants from subgroup with stronger self-ascriptions of primary than secondary
emotions tended to infrahumanize the ingroup. In conclusion, when secondary emotions
dominate over primary emotions in the representation of the self, the projection
of one's own emotions to the ingroup might be responsible for the humanization
of the ingroup and the infrahumanization of outgroups.
Key words: infrahumanization, primary vs. secondary emotions, self-ascription,
ingroup vs. outgroup, essentialistic hypothesis, generalization-of-the-self hypothesis
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